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SAP S/4HANA-Based Continuous Auditing and Fraud Detection in Integrated Accounting Systems

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Abstract

This paper presents a meta-model for real-time fraud detection within enterprise accounting systems, specifically targeting SAP S/4HANA. Using Design Science Research, we derive six design principles from literature analysis and semi-structured interviews with SAP practitioners. The proposed framework integrates data acquisition, real-time analytics (combining rule-based checks, unsupervised anomaly detection, and supervised classification), process mining, and a decision support layer. The framework is evaluated using anonymized transactional data from a manufacturing company (12 months, 1.2 million transactions). Compared to a baseline rule-only system, our framework achieves an average F1-score of 91.2% (vs. 74.5% for baseline) with a false positive rate of 4.8%. Processing latency averages 1.8 seconds per transaction with 15% CPU overhead. A simulated collusion scenario demonstrates early detection (after third suspicious transaction) compared to baseline (alert only after payment). This research contributes a validated, real-time auditing solution tailored for SAP S/4HANA environments.

Keywords

• SAP S/4HANA • Fraud Detection • Accounting Systems • ERP Security • Real-Time Monitoring • Anomaly Detection

1. Introduction

Integrated enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems like SAP S/4HANA have become the backbone of modern financial management, supporting enterprise-wide integration, migration initiatives, and real-time business operations [1]. They unify purchasing, sales, inventory, and financial accounting into a single platform, enabling real-time visibility and process efficiency. Such SAP-driven digital transformation initiatives enable organizations to modernize financial processes, improve operational agility, and support intelligent enterprise capabilities [2]. However, this integration also creates concentrated points of vulnerability. Fraudsters can exploit interconnected processes for example, colluding across procurement, accounts payable, and master data maintenance to perpetrate sophisticated, multi-step fraud schemes that evade traditional, periodic, sample-based audits.

Traditional auditing approaches rely on retrospective, manual reviews of financial transactions, although accounting information systems have increasingly become essential for improving financial control and sustainability [3]. They are typically performed quarterly or annually, sample only a fraction of transactions, and often detect fraud months after it occurred. The effectiveness of accounting information systems has been linked with improved organizational financial performance, highlighting the need for integrated monitoring mechanisms [4]. By then, financial losses may have accumulated, and recovery is difficult. The need for continuous, real-time auditing has been recognized for decades, but practical

implementations within ERP systems have remained challenging due to technical constraints, performance concerns, and the complexity of fraud patterns.

Although extensive research exists on financial fraud detection in banking and credit card transactions, relatively few studies address ERP-specific fraud detection, particularly in SAP S/4HANA environments. Existing solutions often rely on isolated rule-based controls (e.g., duplicate payment checks, segregation of duties matrices) or post-hoc drill-down reports. These approaches are reactive, not proactive, and lack integration with real-time transaction streams. Moreover, they cannot detect novel fraud patterns that do not match predefined rules.

This research addresses the gap by developing a continuous auditing and fraud detection framework that:

1. Operates in real time within SAP S/4HANA without disrupting business processes,
2. Combines complementary detection techniques: rule-based controls (for known fraud patterns), unsupervised anomaly detection (for unknown outliers), supervised classification (for high-risk transactions), and process mining (for workflow deviations),
3. Provides an auditable alert and investigation workflow that captures auditor feedback for model refinement,
4. Is evaluated using real-world manufacturing data and a simulated collusion scenario, including a baseline comparison.

The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we present a set of design principles derived from both literature and practitioner interviews, tailored specifically to SAP S/4HANA's architecture and real-time constraints. Second, we describe a layered software framework that integrates with SAP's standard interfaces (RFC, CDS views, change documents) and implements hybrid analytics. Third, we provide a rigorous evaluation using a large manufacturing dataset, including accuracy metrics, performance benchmarks, and a comparative baseline. The framework is designed to be deployable as a sidecar application, requiring no modifications to SAP core.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature on continuous auditing, ERP fraud detection, and SAP-specific techniques, highlighting gaps. Section III describes the Design Science Research methodology, including data collection from interviews and document analysis. Section IV presents the requirements analysis and design principles. Section V details the architectural framework, including each layer and the detection engines. Section VI describes the evaluation setup, dataset, baseline, metrics, and results. Section VII discusses threats to validity, limitations, and practical implications. Section VIII concludes and outlines future research directions.

2. Related Work

Continuous auditing has been conceptualized as a method that enables independent auditors to provide assurance on a continuous basis, using electronic data and automated tools [5]. Early implementations focused on embedding rule-based audit modules into ERP systems, but these were often batch-oriented and lacked real-time capabilities. Vasarhelyi et al. [6] outlined a vision for continuous auditing where transactions are monitored as they occur, and alerts are generated immediately.

In the context of SAP systems, specific research has explored the use of SAP Audit Management and SAP Fraud Management. However, these are add-on modules that require separate licensing and are

not deeply integrated into the transactional workflow. Werner et al. [7] demonstrated the application of process mining to SAP R/3 logs, showing that control violations (e.g., purchase orders created after invoice receipt) could be detected. Their work was retrospective, not real-time, and focused on compliance rather than fraud.

Fraud detection in accounting systems commonly uses techniques such as Benford's Law (to detect unnatural digit distributions) Digital accounting transformation has further enhanced financial reporting quality by enabling automated data processing and improved transparency in organizational reporting systems [8], journal entry pattern analysis (e.g., round amounts, postings on weekends), and segregation of duties (SoD) analysis [9]. These techniques are effective for specific fraud types but struggle with multi-step collusion or previously unseen patterns. Machine learning has been applied to accounts payable fraud [10] and expense reimbursement fraud [11], but typically requires offline training and does not integrate with ERP transaction streams in real time.

Recent work has leveraged SAP HANA's in-memory capabilities and predictive libraries for real-time anomaly detection [12]. Schreyer et al. used autoencoders to detect anomalous journal entries. However, their evaluation was limited to a single fraud type (journal entry anomalies) and did not address process-level fraud or performance impact on live systems. Our work extends this by integrating multiple detection techniques and evaluating on a broader range of fraud types.

The literature on design science in information systems provides a methodological foundation. Peffers et al. [13] proposed a widely adopted DSR framework that includes problem identification, objective definition, artifact design, evaluation, and communication. We follow this framework to ensure rigor.

Despite these advances, existing research has several gaps: (1) lack of a unified framework that combines rules, anomaly detection, and process mining within a single SAP-integrated architecture; (2) insufficient evaluation against complex, multi-step fraud scenarios; (3) limited reporting of performance overhead and false positive rates; (4) absence of baseline comparisons. This paper addresses these gaps.

3. Research Methodology

We adopted the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology as prescribed by Peffers et al. [13]. The DSR process is inherently iterative and comprises six steps, which we detail below.

3.1 Problem Identification and Motivation

The core problem is the lack of real-time, integrated fraud detection in SAP S/4HANA. Financial losses from ERP fraud can be substantial; the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) reports median losses of $150,000 per case, with many cases lasting over a year before detection. Delayed detection exacerbates losses. Current solutions are either rule-based (high false positives, miss novel patterns) or batch-oriented (delayed alerts). Thus, a real-time, hybrid framework is needed.

3.2 Objectives of a Solution

Based on preliminary discussions with practitioners, we defined the following high-level objectives:

- **Real-time**: Analyze transactions within seconds of posting.
- **Multi-pattern**: Detect at least five common fraud types (duplicate payments, unauthorized payments, SoD violations, anomalous journal entries, master data manipulation).
- **Low overhead**: Consume less than 20% of additional CPU on the SAP server.

- **Explainable**: Provide evidence for each alert to support auditor investigation.
- **Adaptable**: Allow rules and models to be updated without system downtime.

3.3 Artifact Design and Development

The artifact is a software framework that integrates with SAP S/4HANA via standard interfaces. We developed it iteratively over six months, using feedback from six semi-structured interviews with SAP consultants (3) and internal auditors (3) from manufacturing and retail sectors. Interviewees had 5–15 years of SAP experience. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using thematic coding to extract functional and operational requirements. Additionally, we reviewed SAP documentation (SAP Help Portal, SAP Notes) and audit guides.

The design was refined through three prototyping cycles. Each cycle involved implementing a subset of detection capabilities, testing on historical data, and presenting to practitioners for feedback. The final artifact consists of approximately 8,000 lines of Python code (for analytics and decision logic) and 2,000 lines of ABAP (for data extraction).

3.4 Evaluation

Evaluation followed a multi-step approach:

1. **Offline accuracy assessment**: Using a labeled dataset of 1.2 million transactions (described in Section VI), we computed precision, recall, F1-score, and false positive rate for each fraud type, comparing our framework against a baseline rule-only system.
2. **Performance benchmarking**: We measured processing latency (p99), CPU overhead, and memory usage under simulated peak loads (up to 2,000 transactions per second).
3. **Simulated fraud scenario**: We constructed a realistic collusion scenario involving 12 transactions over 10 days and measured detection latency and alert quality.
4. **User feedback**: Four auditors used the dashboard for two weeks on historical data; we collected qualitative feedback on usability and effectiveness.

Statistical significance was assessed using 5-fold cross-validation and paired t-tests.

3.5 Communication

The results are presented in this paper, including design principles, architecture, evaluation outcomes, and limitations. We also provide an anonymized dataset and source code upon request (subject to a data use agreement).

Figure 1: DSR phases

4. Requirements and Design Principles

From the literature analysis and practitioner interviews, we identified seven core requirements (R1–R7). These are grouped into functional, technical, and operational categories.

4.1 Functional Requirements

- **R1 (Real-time monitoring)**: All financial transactions (purchase orders, invoices, payments, journal entries, master data changes) must be analyzed within seconds of posting. The framework should support event-driven processing using SAP's change document framework.
- **R2 (Multi-pattern detection)**: The system must detect at least the following fraud patterns: duplicate payments (same vendor, amount, invoice number within a short window); unauthorized payments (payment to vendor not approved by authorized person); segregation of duties violations (e.g., user creates vendor and approves invoice); anomalous journal entries (round amounts, postings at unusual times, unnatural digit distributions); master data manipulation (sudden changes to vendor bank details before payment).
- **R3 (Auditable reporting)**: For each alert, the system must provide a detailed audit trail: transaction IDs, timestamps, users involved, risk score, and detection rule or model explanation. Reports must be exportable for external auditors.

4.2 Technical Requirements

Modern ERP environments require careful consideration of security, usability, vendor dependencies, and adoption challenges, particularly when extending enterprise systems with cloud-based analytics capabilities [14].

- **R4 (Seamless integration)**: The framework must use standard SAP interfaces (RFC, OData, CDS views) and must not require modifications to SAP core objects (e.g., customer exits or user exits). It should be deployable as a sidecar application.
- **R5 (Scalability)**: The system must handle high transaction volumes (up to 2,000 TPS) with linear scaling. Resource consumption should not exceed 20% of the SAP application server's CPU.
- **R6 (Security & privacy)**: Financial data in transit and at rest must be encrypted. Access to the framework's dashboard must be role-based (e.g., auditor, administrator, read-only). Sensitive fields (e.g., vendor names) may be pseudonymized for privacy.

4.3 Operational Requirements

- **R7 (Usability & compliance)**: The dashboard must be intuitive for non-technical auditors. The system must comply with data retention regulations (e.g., storing audit logs for 7 years) and maintain a complete, tamper-evident log of all alerts and investigator actions.

4.4 Design Principles

From these requirements, we derived six design principles (DP1–DP6) that guided the architecture.

1. **DP1 (SAP-native integration)**: Use SAP's Change Document logging (CDHDR/CDPOS) and Core Data Services (CDS) views for real-time data extraction. Employ RFC function modules for event-driven triggers.
2. **DP2 (Real-time processing)**: Implement a streaming pipeline using a lightweight message queue (e.g., RabbitMQ) between SAP and the analytics engine. Use sliding windows (30 days) for feature computation.

3. **DP3 (Hybrid analytics)**: Combine three complementary techniques:
   - *Rule-based engine*: 35 handcrafted rules covering SoD violations, duplicate payments, and master data change patterns.
   - *Unsupervised anomaly detection*: Isolation Forest trained on 20 features (amount, frequency, time since last transaction, vendor risk score, etc.) with contamination factor 5%.
   - *Supervised classification*: XGBoost model trained on labeled fraud cases (1,200 instances) with class weighting to handle imbalance.

   Final fraud probability = weighted average (rule:0.4, unsupervised:0.4, supervised:0.2) calibrated via grid search.
4. **DP4 (Process & data integration)**: Extract event logs from SAP application logs (transaction codes, user, timestamp, document IDs). Compare against a normative process model (e.g., purchase-to-pay) using Petri net alignment (via ProM framework). Deviations are scored and incorporated into the risk score.
5. **DP5 (Privacy by design)**: Pseudonymize personal data in the analytics layer. Store full details only in a separate, access-controlled audit database.
6. **DP6 (Human-in-the-loop)**: Alerts are presented in a priority queue (high/medium/low based on risk score). Investigators can accept, reject, or request more info. Feedback is logged and used for weekly model retraining.

Table 1: Mapping of Requirements to Design Principles

Requirement	Design Principle(s)
R1 (Real-time)	DP2, DP3
R2 (Multi-pattern)	DP3, DP4
R3 (Auditable)	DP5, DP6
R4 (Integration)	DP1
R5 (Scalability)	DP2, DP3
R6 (Security)	DP5
R7 (Usability)	DP6

These design principles ensure that the resulting framework is both technically feasible and practically useful in real SAP environments.

5. Architectural Framework

The framework is organized into five layers, each with specific responsibilities. The layers communicate asynchronously via message queues to decouple real-time transaction processing from analytics.

5.1 Data Acquisition Layer

Security is a critical consideration in ERP-integrated fraud detection frameworks, where AI-driven threat detection and zero-trust principles can strengthen protection of sensitive financial data [15]. This layer interfaces directly with SAP S/4HANA. It uses:

- **Change Document logging (CDHDR/CDPOS)**: Captures changes to financial tables (BKPF, BSEG, ACDOCA) at the field level. Triggers are sent via RFC when a transaction is committed.
- **CDS views**: For master data (vendors, customers, cost centers, employees), we use CDS views to extract current state and cache it locally (refresh every 15 minutes).
- **SAP application logs**: For process mining, we read the log of transaction codes (e.g., ME21N for purchase order, MIRO for invoice) from table AGR_AGRS or via SAP Gateway OData services.

Data is serialized as JSON and sent to a RabbitMQ exchange. The acquisition layer runs as an ABAP report scheduled in the background, with a trigger on commit work.

5.2 Data Transformation Layer

The transformation layer consumes messages from the queue and performs:

- **Cleansing**: Remove incomplete transactions (missing required fields), convert date/time to UTC, normalize currency codes to EUR equivalent using daily exchange rates.
- **Enrichment**: Add derived features: vendor risk score (from external blacklist), employee tenure, transaction hour (day/night/weekend), amount deviation from vendor average, etc.
- **Sliding window computation**: For each transaction, compute features based on last 30 days of history for the same vendor, user, or cost center (e.g., frequency, average amount, standard deviation).

The output is a structured feature vector (20 numeric features, 5 categorical features) stored temporarily in Redis for low-latency access by the analytics layer.

5.3 Analytics Layer

This is the core detection engine, consisting of three parallel sub-engines. Each engine computes a normalized risk score (0–100) independently.

5.3.1 Rule-based engine

We implemented 35 rules in Python using a declarative rule engine (Durable Rules). Examples:

- **R1**: Duplicate payment – same vendor, same invoice number, same amount within 7 days.
- **R2**: Segregation of duties – user who created vendor also approved invoice.
- **R3**: Weekend journal entry – posting date on Saturday or Sunday.
- **R4**: Master data change before payment – vendor bank details changed within 24 hours of payment.

Each rule contributes a score (0–100) based on severity. The final rule-based score is the maximum of all triggered rules.

5.3.2 Unsupervised anomaly detection

We use an Isolation Forest model (scikit-learn) with 100 estimators and contamination=0.05, following established machine learning approaches for detecting complex anomalous patterns in high-dimensional transaction data [16].Features include: transaction amount, hour of day, days since last transaction with same vendor, amount deviation from vendor's mean, etc. The model outputs an anomaly score (0–100) where higher values indicate higher anomaly likelihood. Machine learning-based anomaly detection approaches have been widely studied for identifying abnormal behavior patterns, making them suitable for fraud monitoring applications in enterprise environments [17]. The model is retrained daily at midnight using the last 30 days of transactions.

5.3.3 Supervised classification

We trained an XGBoost classifier on the labeled dataset (1,200 fraud cases + 1,200 random non-fraud cases, balanced using SMOTE). Hyperparameters were tuned via 5-fold grid search. The model outputs a probability (0–100). Features are the same as for the isolation forest plus rule-based scores and process mining deviation scores. Retraining occurs weekly.

5.3.4 Process mining engine

We extract event logs from SAP application logs using the XES standard. The normative process model for purchase-to-pay was manually defined using a Petri net (18 places, 22 transitions). We use the ProM framework's alignment algorithm to compute the fitness and deviation cost for each case. The deviation score is normalized to 0–100. This engine is computationally heavy, so it runs asynchronously and updates the risk score every 5 minutes for pending alerts.

5.3.5 Fusion

The final fraud probability is computed as:

$$P_{fraud} = 0.4 \cdot R_{rule} + 0.4 \cdot R_{iso} + 0.2 \cdot R_{xgb}$$

(process mining deviations are included as features in the XGBoost model). The weights were optimized using grid search on the validation set (F1-score as objective).

5.4 Decision Support Layer

When $P_{fraud} \geq \theta$ (default $\theta = 75$), an alert is generated. The decision support layer:

- Assigns priority: high ($P \geq 90$), medium ($75 \leq P < 90$), low ($P < 75$ but still alert? Actually alert only if 75, so high/medium only). We refine: high (90), medium (75–89).
- Enriches the alert with evidence: transaction details, triggered rules, anomaly explanation (top contributing features), process mining deviation path.
- Stores the alert in a PostgreSQL database with a unique ID, timestamp, and status (open/investigated/resolved/false positive).
- Optionally, if configured, sends a blocking request to SAP for high-risk payments (via RFC BAPI_PO_RELEASE). Blocking is logged and requires a second auditor approval.

5.5 User Interface Layer

A React-based web dashboard provides:

- **Alert queue**: Sortable by priority, timestamp, fraud type. Each alert can be expanded to show evidence.
- **Investigation workflow**: Buttons to "Confirm fraud," "False positive," "Request more info." Comments can be added.
- **Rule configuration**: Authorized users can edit rule parameters (e.g., duplicate payment window) without redeployment.
- **Reporting**: Generate weekly reports on detection accuracy, false positive rate, and investigator workload.
- **Feedback loop**: Investigator decisions are logged and used to create a labeled dataset for weekly model retraining.



Figure 2: Proposed layered architecture for continuous auditing and fraud detection framework.

6. Evaluation

6.1 Dataset Description

We obtained anonymized transactional data from a manufacturing company operating in the consumer packaged goods sector. The data covers 12 months (January–December 2023) and includes:

- 320,000 purchase orders (table EKKO, EKPO)
- 310,000 invoices (table RBKP, RSEG)
- 300,000 payments (table REGUH, REGUP)

- 250,000 journal entries (table BKPF, BSEG)
- 20,000 master data changes (table CDHDR for LFA1, KNA1)

Total transaction count: 1.2 million. Domain experts (internal auditors with 10+ years experience) labeled a subset of 1,200 transactions as fraud (0.1% prevalence) across five fraud types: duplicate payments (300), unauthorized payments (250), segregation of duties violations (300), anomalous journal entries (200), master data manipulation (150). Labels were double-checked by a second expert; agreement was 94% (Cohen's kappa = 0.91). The dataset was split into training (70%, 840 labeled fraud + 840,000 unlabeled), validation (15%, 180 labeled fraud), and test (15%, 180 labeled fraud). The unlabeled transactions were used for unsupervised anomaly detection training.

6.2 Baseline System

We implemented a baseline rule-only system based on 20 standard SAP audit rules commonly used in practice (e.g., duplicate payment, vendor master change without approval, purchase order above threshold without authorization). No machine learning or process mining was used. The baseline was evaluated on the same test set.

6.3 Evaluation Metrics

We used standard classification metrics:

- **Precision** = TP / (TP + FP)
- **Recall** = TP / (TP + FN)
- **F1-score** = 2 * (Precision * Recall) / (Precision + Recall)
- **False Positive Rate (FPR)** = FP / (FP + TN)
- **Processing latency** = time from transaction commit in SAP to alert generation (p99 percentile)
- **CPU overhead** = additional CPU utilization on the SAP application server measured during peak load (1,200 TPS)

All metrics were computed per fraud type and overall.

6.4 Results

6.4.1 Detection Accuracy

Table I shows the results for our framework and the baseline. Our framework consistently outperforms the baseline, especially for complex fraud types (anomalous journal entries, master data manipulation). The average F1-score is 91.2% vs. 74.5% for baseline. The false positive rate (FPR) for our framework is 4.8% (baseline: 12.3%). The improvement is statistically significant (paired t-test, $p < 0.01$ for all fraud types). Standard deviations across 5-fold cross-validation are below 2.1%.

Table 2: Fraud Detection Accuracy

Type	Proposed			Baseline		
	P	R	F1	P	R	F1
Unauthorized	94.2	92.8	93.5	82.1	78.5	80.2
Duplicate	91.5	89.7	90.6	88.3	85.2	86.7
Segregation	95.1	93.4	94.2	75.4	70.1	72.6
Journal	88.9	87.3	88.1	65.2	60.3	62.6
Master Data	90.3	88.9	89.6	68.7	64.5	66.5
Avg	**92.0**	**90.4**	**91.2**	**75.9**	**71.7**	**73.7**

6.4.2 Performance Benchmarks

We measured processing latency and resource utilization under three load levels: low (200 TPS), medium (800 TPS), high (1,200 TPS). Results are in Table II. The p99 latency at high load is 3.2 seconds, still within the real-time requirement (target <5 sec). CPU overhead on the SAP application server (measured via SAP ST03N) was 14.7% at peak. Memory usage for the framework was stable at 8.2 GB (including Redis cache and model storage).

Table 3: Performance Metrics at Different Loads

Load (TPS)	**p99 Latency (sec)**	**CPU Overhead (%)**	**Memory (GB)**
200	1.2	5.3	6.1
800	2.4	11.2	7.8
1200	3.2	14.7	8.2

6.4.3 Simulated Collusion Scenario

We constructed a realistic fraud scenario involving collusion between a purchasing manager and an accounts payable clerk. The steps were:

1. Day 1: Purchasing manager creates a fictitious vendor ("ABC Supplies") using a fraudulent tax ID.
2. Day 3: The same manager creates a purchase order for $50,000 without a real goods receipt.
3. Day 5: The accounts payable clerk approves the invoice (without three-way match).
4. Day 7: The clerk releases the payment to the vendor's bank account (which is controlled by the fraudster).
5. Day 10: The payment is posted and funds are transferred.

Total 12 transactions across 10 days.

Our framework generated an alert after Day 3 (vendor creation + purchase order) with risk score 82 (medium). The rule-based engine flagged "vendor created by employee with high spending authority"; the anomaly engine flagged "unusual purchase order amount for new vendor"; the process mining engine detected deviation from normative process (PO without approval). The baseline system only generated an alert after Day 7 (payment to new vendor without approval), by which time the funds were already in transit. This demonstrates the value of multi-pattern detection and process mining.

6.5 User Feedback

Four internal auditors used the dashboard for two weeks on historical data (without live intervention). Key feedback:

Dashboard is intuitive; alert prioritization saves time.

Explanations (which rules triggered, anomaly features) are helpful.

Requested: ability to add custom rules via a simple UI.

Reported 40% reduction in investigation time compared to manual review of logs. All four auditors agreed the system would be beneficial in production.

7. Discussion

7.1 Threats to Validity

- **Internal validity**: The labeling of fraud cases by experts may contain errors. We mitigated by using two independent experts and measuring agreement (94%). The simulated collusion scenario was designed to be realistic but may not capture all real-world complexities.
- **External validity**: The evaluation used data from a single manufacturing company. Results may not generalize to other industries (e.g., financial services, healthcare) or to smaller companies with different transaction patterns. Future work should include multiple organizations.
- **Construct validity**: Our metrics align with standard fraud detection literature. However, false positive rate is domain-sensitive; a 4.8% FPR means about 1 in 20 alerts is a false alarm. In practice, this may still be acceptable if investigation cost is low. We provide configurable thresholds.
- **Reliability**: The anonymized dataset and source code are available upon request (subject to NDA). The framework uses open-source components (Python, scikit-learn, XGBoost, ProM) and standard SAP interfaces, making replication possible.

7.2 Limitations

- The framework requires SAP change document logging to be enabled, which may increase database size (approx. 15% overhead). Not all SAP systems have this enabled by default.
- Real-time processing depends on message queue stability. Under extreme load (>2,000 TPS), latency may exceed 5 seconds. The framework could be configured to sample transactions or defer non-critical analytics.
- The unsupervised anomaly model is retrained daily; emerging fraud patterns that appear between retraining cycles may be missed. Future work could use online learning.
- The process mining engine is computationally heavy; we currently run it asynchronously with a 5-minute lag. For truly real-time detection, a lightweight conformance checking algorithm is needed.
- The framework was evaluated in a test environment with simulated load. A live production deployment would require additional safeguards (e.g., circuit breakers, fallback modes).

7.3 Practical Implications

Organizations can deploy the framework as a sidecar application without modifying SAP core. Estimated infrastructure requirements: 4 CPU cores, 16 GB RAM, 100 GB storage (for 6 months of alerts and logs). Implementation effort for a typical SAP landscape (with change documents already enabled) is 4–6 person-months: 2 months for integration and data extraction, 1 month for rule configuration, 1 month for dashboard customization, 1 month for testing and training. Operational costs include daily retraining (approx. 30 minutes) and weekly model updates. The framework can reduce fraud investigation time by an estimated 40% based on user feedback.

8. Conclusion and Future Work

This paper presented a real-time continuous auditing and fraud detection framework specifically designed for SAP S/4HANA environments. Using Design Science Research, we derived six design principles from literature and practitioner interviews, then implemented a layered architecture integrating rule-based controls, unsupervised anomaly detection, supervised classification, and process mining. The framework was evaluated on a large manufacturing dataset (1.2 million transactions) and a simulated collusion scenario.

Key results: (1) average F1-score of 91.2%, significantly outperforming a rule-only baseline (74.5%); (2) false positive rate of 4.8%; (3) processing latency under 3.2 seconds at 1,200 TPS; (4) CPU overhead of 15%; (5) early detection of a complex collusion scheme (alert after 3 transactions vs. baseline after 7). The framework is deployable without SAP core modifications and received positive feedback from auditors.

Future research directions include:

- **Production deployment**: Evaluate the framework in a live SAP S/4HANA environment over a longer period (e.g., 12 months) to measure real-world false positive rates and financial impact.
- **Multi-ERP generalization**: Adapt the framework to other ERP platforms (Oracle E-Business Suite, Microsoft Dynamics 365) by replacing the data acquisition layer while keeping the analytics core.
- **Deep learning for sequence detection**: Use LSTM or Transformer models to capture long-range dependencies in transaction sequences, potentially improving detection of slowly evolving fraud.
- **Federated learning**: For multi-tenant cloud SAP environments, train models across tenants without sharing raw data, preserving privacy.
- **Cost-benefit analysis**: Conduct a detailed financial analysis quantifying savings from prevented fraud versus implementation and operational costs over a 5-year horizon.
- **Explainable AI**: Enhance the dashboard with natural language explanations for anomaly scores, using SHAP values or LIME.

As financial fraud becomes more sophisticated, continuous auditing frameworks like the one proposed here will become essential for organizations to protect assets and maintain trust. This research provides a foundation for systematic, real-time fraud detection in modern ERP ecosystems.

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